Abstract: Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think ought to be done (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think should be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for those who design institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior.
Leges sine moribus vanae -Horace, Odes 3, 24

I. Introduction
People often follow social norms, such as norms of reciprocity or fairness, even when obedience is not in their immediate self-interest and there is no obvious sanction looming over the potential transgressor. Social norms are thus recognized as important motivations behind individual decision making in several economic models (see, e.g., Elster, 1989; Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Camerer, 2003) . Empirical studies of norm conformity clearly show that focusing people on an existing norm is an important step toward compliance (Cialdini et al. 1990 ).
Moreover, as argued by Bicchieri (2006) , whether people obey a norm depends crucially on two types of expectations: empirical and normative. That is, individuals have preferences for conforming to social norms that are conditional on both types of expectations being present. However, how different types of expectations affect norm compliance, especially when they are in conflict, has gone largely unstudied. This paper provides, to our knowledge, the first evidence regarding the relative influence of empirical and normative expectations on individual decisions in situations involving social norms.
The distinction between normative and empirical expectations is a long-standing one in the sociology and philosophy literatures (Goffman, 1963; Paprzycka, K., 1999) . By an empirical expectation of conformity to a given norm we mean that one expects the norm to be followed by a majority of people in the appropriate circumstances. Such expectations can be grounded on past observations of conformity or its consequences, on indirect knowledge or even on projection, as when we think our own behavior is representative of what most other people would do in similar circumstances. Previous research suggests that people tend to do what they believe others who are similar to them would do in a similar situation (Cialdini, 1990) Yet expecting others to follow a pro-social norm may not be a compelling reason to conform. Because social norms usually prescribe behavior that may be in conflict with narrow, self-interested motives, sometimes such expectations will encourage defection.
For example, the temptation to free-ride may be high when one expects a sufficient number of others will contribute to a public good. In this case, the free rider is almost justified in her choice to defect: the good will be provided anyway and she gains more when she contributes less. Thus, as discussed elsewhere (Bicchieri, 2006) , empirical expectations of majority conformity is a necessary, but might not be a sufficient condition for norm compliance. Normative expectations are the second, important ingredient in leading people to follow a norm (Sugden, 1998 and 2004; Bicchieri, 2006) A normative expectation is the belief that others expect one to conform to a given norm 1 . This is not simply a second-degree empirical expectation; a normative expectation involves the beliefs that others think one ought to conform to the norm in the appropriate circumstances, that one has an obligation to do so. For some individuals, recognizing the legitimacy of others' expectations, and thus their disapproval of norm violation, is enough to induce a preference for conformity (Xiao and Houser, 2006) .
Other individuals need further inducements such as the possibility of monetary sanctions
by those who expect (and want) their conformity (Fehr and Gächter, 2000) .
When a norm is largely followed, one's expectation regarding what people will do is often in line with one's expectation regarding what people think one ought to do. In this case, normative and empirical expectations work in the same direction and motivate the same behavior. For example, when most of your neighbors recycle, you form the empirical expectation that people do recycle. At the same time, your normative expectation is also that people think you should recycle. Thus, the presence of both expectations makes it more likely that you will recycle.
On the other hand, when a norm is largely violated we may experience an inconsistency between normative and empirical expectations. An example is corruption.
Even in the presence of laws and social norms condemning corruption, the widespread occurrence of bribery and kickbacks can induce people to form empirical expectations that most people are corrupt, while simultaneously holding the normative expectation that most people disapprove of corruption. In cases such as this, which expectation might have a greater effect on public officers' willingness to accept bribes? The answer to this question is clearly crucial for policy and institution design. If the goal is to enforce prosocial norms, the expectation to which we appeal can matter a great deal.
In the past decades, many experiments have shed light on the role of social norms in influencing individuals' decisions. For example, it was discovered that punishment and emotions are two key factors in norm compliance (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher,, 2004 for a good review). In particular, people often incur costs to punish norm violators and in this way enforce norms of cooperation and fairness (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002) . Absent formal sanctions, negative emotions such as shame and guilt are also effective enforcers of social norms (Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Elster, 1989 Elster, , 1999 Rilling J, et al., 2002) . Punishment and emotions have also been closely linked to expectations (Lewis, 1969; Sugden, 2000) . 2 Meanwhile, there is substantial experimental literature on the importance of expectations and beliefs in directing decisions both when expectations are payoff-related (Rapoport and Eshed-Levy, 1989; Rapoport and Suleiman, 1993; Offerman et al., 1996; Croson, 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006) and payoffindependent (Cason and Mui, 1998; Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005; Krupka and Weber, 2006) .
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In spite of the close connection between social norms and expectations (see also Lewis, 1969; Bicchieri, 2006; Young, forthcoming) , we are not aware of any previous empirical study of the relative importance of empirical and normative expectations in decisions about norm compliance. Here we present a version of the Dictator game in which subjects' empirical and normative expectations are exogenously and independently manipulated in the direction of fairness or selfishness. We accomplish this by providing subjects with different types of information in a way that allows us to elicit conflicting normative and empirical expectations. In doing so, we obtain systematic evidence that empirical expectations regarding other people's behavior are the primary driving force behind norm conformity. In contrast, normative expectations regarding what others think 2 For example, Sugden's theory of normative expectations suggests that humans have a desire to conform to the expectations of others (normative expectations) and this desire arises from a fear of disapproval or resentment.
3 Brandts and Fatás (2001) investigate whether subjects' contributions in a public goods game are affected by information about the average giving of others in the same situation. They find that such payoffindependent social information has a rather weak effect on contributions.
should be done can predict individuals' decisions only when these expectations are positively related to one's empirical expectations.
II. Experiment design
Dictator games have been widely used to study fairness or beneficence motives. In the standard Dictator game, two subjects are paired randomly, one as dictator (divider in the instructions) and the other as receiver (counterpart in the instructions). The dictator decides how much of $10 s/he wants to send to the receiver and the receiver earns that amount. The amount sent can be interpreted as a measure of fairness, because there are no other consequences associated with dictators' decisions. Often people make different decisions and also have different belief regarding what decisions ought to be made in these games (Xiao and Houser, 2006) . By providing our subjects with different types of information about other subjects' choices and beliefs, we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations, and compare dictators' decisions under different normative and empirical expectations.
II.A. Expectation manipulation
To manipulate dictators' expectations, we selectively drew data from some sessions of Dictator games reported in Xiao and Houser (2006 In the FB (or FC) treatment, dictators are presented with data from a session where the majority of dictators believed that a fair split should be chosen (or chose a fair split).
Thus, we hypothesize that our subjects' normative (empirical) expectations will move toward fairness, and therefore generate more fair offers. Similarly, in the SB (or SC) treatment when subjects are informed that a majority of previous dictators believed that only a small amount should be offered (or offered an unfair split), normative (empirical) expectations will move toward selfishness, leading to an increase in selfish offers.
Inferences about the effects of these different expectations can be drawn by examining dictators' decisions when there is a conflict between normative and empirical expectations in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments: the normative expectation goes in the direction of fairness (selfishness) but the empirical expectation is that other dictators behave selfishly (fairly).
Since we use data from Xiao and Houser (2006) , our Dictator game is designed like the game they devised. In particular, dictators can offer receivers any integer amount from $1 to $9, excluding $7 and $3. In our experiment dictators receive information, so one possible complication is that this information might lead to experimenter demand effects (e.g., subjects might try to guess the experimenter's intention and behave accordingly). To mitigate this problem, we used a "double blind" procedure that ensures subjects understand that neither other subjects nor the experimenter can connect a dictator's decision to a dictator's identity (see the instructions in Appendix A for details).
In addition, the message containing the information follows a short note: In previous
experiments, dividers have often wanted to know the views or decisions of other dividers.
The information below is given to every divider in this experiment.
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II. B. Expectation elicitation
Immediately after each dictator made her decision, we gave her a survey to elicit her expectations about the choices and presumed expectations of other participants in the experiment. Dictators were rewarded based on the accuracy of the expectations they reported. In particular, to elicit empirical expectations, dictators were asked how many dictators they believed split the money approximately equally (i.e., gave the receiver $5 or $4), and were paid $1 if their answer matched the actual number of fair choices.
Normative expectations refer to a dictator's beliefs regarding what others think one ought to do. To elicit these expectations, subjects were asked, first, whether they thought 
II.C. Procedures
Subjects were recruited at the University of Pennsylvania through the "Experiments @ Penn" web-based recruitment system. Each subject was randomly assigned the role of dictator or receiver. Dictators and receivers were separated and they could not see each other or communicate throughout the experiment.
Each subject was randomly assigned a letter as his or her ID for the duration of the experiment. A receiver and a dictator were paired if they held the same letter. All subjects received an instruction sheet explaining the rules of the game. In addition to the instructions, each dictator also received a separate sheet with one of the messages listed in Table 1 and the short note mentioned in section II. A. A dictator's decision card was attached to the message sheet. The game started after every subject finished the instructions.
Each subject played the game exactly once. Our procedures ensured it was clear to dictators that no one, including the experimenters, knew their decisions. Dictators indicated their chosen split on a decision sheet, wrote down their ID on the back of the decision card and then put the card into a blank envelope. After all dictators had finished, the experimenter collected all the envelopes and then gave each receiver his or her dictator's envelope according to the ID. At the end of the experiment, subjects' earnings were put in envelopes marked with ID letters. Each subject picked up her earnings envelope privately. Each subject received a $5 show up bonus in addition to the money earned in the game and the survey ($6 on average). Subjects were in the lab about 30 minutes.
III. Results
We . This average by treatment is also plotted in Figure 1 .
First, as expected, EE(fair offer) and NE(fair offer) in FB and FC treatments are significantly higher than those in SB and SC treatments (p<0.001 in all the four pairwise Mann-Whitney tests). It is important to note that when only one message (either about other dictators' beliefs or choices) is presented, both empirical and normative expectations are affected. For example, in the FC treatment where dictators were only informed that the majority of dictators in another session made a fair offer, dictators expected 64% of dictators to make fair offers and also expected 68% of dictators to believe that fair offers ought to be made. In contrast, when dictators only knew that a majority of dictators in a previous session made a selfish offer (i.e., gave $2 or $1) in the SC treatment, dictators expected that only 37% of dictators would make a fair offer and that just 41% of dictators believed fair offers ought to be made as well. Similar results hold for the SB and FB treatments.
The fact that dictators change both empirical and normative expectations in the same direction when only one message is presented makes clear that dictators' decisions in the SB, SC, FB and FC treatments cannot distinguish the relative behavioral importance of empirical and normative expectations. However, this is not the case in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments.
For one, the change of normative expectations from the FB+SC treatment to the SB+FC treatment goes in a different direction than the change we observe in empirical expectations. As shown in Figure 1 , compared with the FB+SC treatment, EE(fair offer) in the SB+FC treatment are higher (43% and 48%, respectively); however, NE(fair offer) are lower in the SB+FC treatment (57% and 52%, respectively). Second, NE(fair offer) in the FB+SC treatment are significantly higher than EE(fair offer) (Wilcoxon matchedpairs signed-ranks test, p=0.01). These results suggest that the manipulation in these two treatments allows us to separate the effects of normative and empirical expectations on choice. This is a crucial step in providing evidence about the relative importance of the two expectations for predicting decisions. By examining which expectation is more consistent with actual decisions, especially between the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments we just discussed, we demonstrate next that empirical expectation seem to be a better predictor of decisions than normative expectation. However, as we already noted, the dictators' behavior in these four treatments cannot tease apart the separate influence of normative and empirical expectations on fair choices.
III.A.2 Expectations and fair choices
To explore this issue, we now turn to the dictators' behavior in the FB+SC and SB+FC treatments, where they face inconsistent information about other players' previous choices and beliefs.
As shown in Figure 2 , the percentage of fair offers in the SB+FC treatment is quite close to what we observe in the FC treatment, and very different from the results of the SB treatment. In particular, the percentage of fair offers in the SB+FC treatment is not significantly lower than in the FC treatment (45% vs. 52%, Mann-Whitney one-tail test, p=0.32) but is significantly higher than in the SB treatment (45% vs. 21%, MannWhitney one-tail test, p=0.05). Meanwhile, the percentage of fair offers in the FB+SC treatment is closer to what we observe in the SC rather than in the FB treatment (35% vs. 33% and 35% vs. 48% respectively), although neither of the two comparisons yields a statistically significant difference. These comparisons provide preliminary evidence that empirical expectations play a greater role than normative expectations in choosing to make a fair offer. It is possible that dictators' expectations about receivers' beliefs are affected by the information they receive in each treatment, and if so this could also influence dictators' decisions. We have some evidence about this possibility. In all sessions, at least 80% of dictators expect receivers to believe that dividers should make a fair offer. The absence of variation along this dimension among treatments suggests that this expectation has no significant effect on dictators' decisions 6 . Furthermore, for each treatment, we obtain data on whether dictator i thinks her receiver would expect her to make a fair offer
=1 if the dictator believes her receiver expects she will offer 40% or 50%; and equals zero otherwise). We calculated the proportion of dictators who believed receivers expected fair offers ( ) ' ( EE s receiver EE k ), and compared this to the actual proportion of fair choices. As shown in Figure 4 , it is clear that this expectation does not predict dictators' choices.
III.B. Individual level analysis of expectations and choices
The results derived by aggregating our data suggest that mean empirical expectations are better predictors of mean decisions than mean normative expectations. Of course, aggregate data do not give us much information about the effect of expectations on decisions at the individual level. To investigate how the two types of expectations affect subjects' specific decisions we pursue next an analysis at the individual level.
Our approach is to run a probit regression. Our binary dependent variable is whether dictator i made a fair offer. We assume the probit model's error term is independent across subjects in different sessions but allow it to be correlated among subjects within the same session. With respect to our independent variables, we began by considering both linear and non-linear terms connecting dictators' expectations to their decisions. In particular, our independent variables included ) In our experiment expectations were exogenously manipulated. Nevertheless, it is in principle possible that our regression analysis suffers from an endogeneity bias due to the inclusion of elicited expectations as independent variables. In particular, if subjects' declared expectations depend on their decisions, perhaps because they wish to defend such decisions, then elicited expectations would be endogenous in our analysis. However, we have no evidence supporting this possibility. Indeed, the dependence of reported expectations on decisions is inconsistent with the fact that most dictators expect receivers to believe that the division ought to be fair. In addition, there is substantial variation between elicited expectations, even among dictators who make the same choice. Thus, 7 We didn't include the square term of
because it is a dummy variable.
we are comfortable in proceeding under the standard assumption that our regression analysis is appropriately specified 8 .
The results of our analysis are detailed in is statistically insignificant, and its marginal effect on the probability of fair choices is economically insignificant in magnitude.
In summary, our aggregate analysis and individual-level analysis together provide compelling and convergent evidence that empirical expectations about other dictators' behaviors, but not normative expectations, are a critical factor in dictators' decisions. 8 In principle we could provide formal evidence against endogeneity using a Hausman specification test. However, our data do not include the individual-level instrumental variables necessary to implement this test. Our results have important implication for the policy makers whose goal is to stipulate regulations to mitigate undesirable behavior, especially when violations are widespread. Our findings suggest that, for a policy to be effective, it is not enough to emphasize only the illegitimacy or the negative consequences of the undesirable behavior.
IV. Discussion
It is even more important to stress that many people do follow the relevant norms. This is consistent with the notion of a "zero tolerance policy". That is, to reduce crime it could be quite important to sanction even small offenses such as graffiti. The reason is that evidence that most society members follow norms will likely promote other members' spontaneous norm compliance.
Our findings leave unexplained why people follow empirical instead of normative expectations when these two are inconsistent. One possible reason is that, in naturally occurring environments, punishment is often imposed on those whose behavior differs from the majority. On the other hand, even when it is not formally approved, misconduct might be only weakly punished -or perhaps not punished at all -when the behavior is common. For example, in a society with high rates of corruption people are not likely to expect corrupt acts to be punished, even in those cases where there exist laws explicitly prohibiting corruption. To foster our understanding of how norms, expectations and decisions interact, we are conducting further research on how punishment decisions correlate with normative and empirical expectations.
Table 1. Messages by treatment
Treatment Message
FB:
Fair Belief 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year said that dividers should share the amount approximately equally (i.e., choose option C or D (their counterpart gets 40% or more)).
SB:
Selfish Belief 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year said that dividers should approximately maximize their own earnings (i.e., choose option A or B (their counterpart gets 20% or less)).
FC:
Fair Choice 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year shared the amount approximately equally (i.e., chose option C or D (their counterpart got 40% or more)).
SC:
Selfish Choice 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year approximately maximized their own earnings (i.e., chose option A or B (their counterpart got 20% or less)).
FB+SC:
Fair Belief but Selfish Choice 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year said that dividers should share the amount approximately equally (i.e., choose option C or D (their counterpart gets 40% or more)).
On the other hand, in a different session of this experiment last year, 60% of the dividers approximately maximized their own earnings (i.e., chose option A or B (their counterpart got 20% or less)).
SB+FC:
Selfish Belief but Fair Choice 60% of the dividers who participated in a session of this experiment last year said that dividers should approximately maximize their own earnings (i.e., choose option A or B (their counterpart gets 20% or less)).
On the other hand, in a different session of this experiment last year, 60% of the dividers shared the amount approximately equally (i.e., chose option C or D (their counterpart got 40% or more)).
Note:
The order of the two messages in FB+SC treatment and SB+FC treatment is randomized.
It turns out there is not order effect. 
I. Divider Instructions
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you.
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Divider and your matched participant will be referred to as your Counterpart. You and your Counterpart will participate only once in this decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. This is how the experiment works.
Your task is to divide $10 between the two of you. How much money you end up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decisions you make.
Divider (You)
You will choose a Dividing Option (described in detail below). A Dividing Option determines how much of $10 will go to the Divider (you) and how much will go to your Counterpart.
Dividing Option
The possible divisions appear in the table below. You must choose only one of them. Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts Each of you has randomly chosen an envelope. In each envelope there is a tag marked with a letter. This letter is your ID for this experiment. Persons in this room who get tags marked with the same letter will be paired. Please do not show anyone your ID letter.
Possible Dividing Options
Step 2: Divider chooses the option The Divider will be given a card where s/he can write down her/his decision. Below is a sample decision card:
After making the decision, the Divider will also write the letter ID on the back of the decision card, and then put it into his/her envelope.
Step 3: The Counterpart receives the Divider's decision. After every Divider has finished, the experimenter will give each Divider's envelope to his/her Counterpart according to the ID on the card. The Counterpart will see the decision made by the divider and then put the decision card back into the envelope. After each Counterpart has finished an experimenter will collect all the envelopes.
Step 4: Receive cash payment privately The experimenter will calculate the earnings of each Divider and each Counterpart. To keep everyone's decision and earnings anonymous, the experimenter will put each participant's earnings in an envelope marked with her/his ID letter. All Dividers' envelopes will be placed on one desk, and all Counterparts' envelopes will be placed on a different desk. Then, Dividers will be called one by one. When called, each Divider will pick up the envelope labeled with her/his letter ID. Then the Divider will exit the lab and drop all other supplies into the box outside the lab door. Every Counterpart will be paid in the same way after all the Dividers have been paid and have left the lab.
Divider and Counterpart will remain anonymously matched at all times during the experiment. Even the experimenter will not know your decisions.
End of Instructions
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions.
Divider: (Dividing option)
I choose dividing option_______. That is, Divider gets $_____ Counterpart gets $____
II. Counterpart Instructions
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched participant will never be informed about your identity. Your matched participant is in the role of Divider and you will be referred to as Divider's Counterpart. You and your Divider will participate only once in this decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. This is how the experiment works.
The task is to divide $10 between the two of you. How much money you end up with at the end of the experiment depends on the decision your Divider makes.
Divider
The Divider will choose a Dividing Option (described in detail below). A Dividing Option determines how much of $10 will go to the Divider and how much will go to you.
Dividing Option
The possible divisions appear in the table below. The Divider must choose only one of them. Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts Each of you has randomly chosen an envelope. In each envelope there is a tag marked with a letter. This letter is your ID for this experiment. Persons in this room who get tags marked with the same letter will be paired. Please do not show anyone your ID letter.
Possible Dividing Options
End of Instructions
Please raise your hand to indicate that you are finished reading these instructions. 
